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Abstract 
The article surveys the evidence for nomothesia procedures in the twenty years after 
the end of the Lamian war. It argues that fourth-century nomothesia could not survive 
the constitutional reforms imposed by Antigonus. Its procedures were later replaced by 
the individual action of the nomothetes Demetrius of Phalerum, who at the same time 
imposed on the Assembly the check of nomophylakes who took over the powers of the 
graphe paranomon and the graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai. Finally, after the restoration 
of democracy in 307, nomothetai reappeared for the last time, but were not, like before 
322, in charge of voting on new proposals and enacting new legislation. They were special 
magistrates, possibly introduced by Demetrius Poliorcetes, in charge of proposing new 
laws to the Assembly for the purpose of reforming the constitution after the regime 
of Demetrius of Phalerum. After this last appearance of nomothetai in the late fourth 
century, in the third century no recognizable specific nomothesia procedure survived, 
and laws were enacted by the Assembly like decrees. The reason for the disappearance of 
nomothesia, it is argued, must be understood both in the context of the evolution of the 
relevant institutions, and in that of the abuse of the relevant terminology by Macedonian-
controlled regimes at the end of the fourth century.
L'articolo discute le fonti rilevanti per la ricostruzione delle procedure di nomothesia 
nei vent'anni successivi alla guerra Lamiaca e argomenta che la nomothesia, nella 
versione comune nel quarto secolo, non sopravvisse alle riforme costituzionali imposte 
da Antipatro. Le sue procedure furono dopo il 317 soppiantate dall'azione individuale di 
Demetrio di Falero, che assunse il ruolo di nomoteta e impose sull'Assemblea il controllo 
di un gruppo di nomophylakes con poteri che un tempo erano stati esercitati attraverso 
la graphe paranomon e la graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai. Dopo la restaurazione della 
democrazia ad opera di Demetrio Poliorcete un gruppo di nomoteti fa capolino per 
l'ultima volta nelle fonti. Il loro ruolo tuttavia non è quello di approvare le proposte di 
legge, come avveniva perima del 322, ma quello di proporre nuove leggi all'Assemblea, allo 
scopo di riformare la costituzione dopo la caduta di Demetrio di Falero. La loro istituzione 
1. In writing this article I have incurred many debts: first of all, Edward Harris, P.J. Rhodes and 
Johannes Bernhardt have gone through versions of the article and provided me with extensive 
and invaluable feedback. I am also grateful to the audiences of the 3rd International Meeting of 
Young Historians of Ancient Greek Law and of the 4. Darmstädter Diskussionen for lively discus-
sions and interesting suggestions. I also want to thank Shane Wallace and Paschalis Paschidis for 
sharing with me some of their work and ideas. Finally, I need to thank the Alexander von Hum-
boldt Stiftung for providing me with the time and means to work on this article.
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negli ultimi anni del quarto secolo è probabilmente da collegare all'azione esplicita 
di Demetrio Poliorcete. Dal terzo secolo in poi non c'è alcuna traccia di una procedura 
separata di nomothesia: le leggi vengono probabilmente approvate dall'Assemblea allo 
stesso modo dei decreti. Nella conclusione si sostiene che la ragione della scomparsa della 
nomothesia vanno cercate tanto nell'evoluzione intrinseca delle procedure di nomothesia 
lungo il quarto secolo quanto all'abuso di questa terminologia da parte di vari regimi 
filomacedoni negli ultimi anni del quarto secolo.
Introduction
The legislative procedures implemented by the Athenians after democracy 
was restored at the end of the fifth century BCE have been the subject of 
several studies. There has been much debate both about the procedures 
used to revise and reform the Athenian constitution in the last decade of 
the fifth century2 and about how the Athenian legislated in the fourth.3 
In a recent article Edward Harris and I have shown that at the end of the 
fifth century a board of anagrapheis was given the task of finding the laws 
of Draco and Solon, submitting them to the Assembly for ratification and 
then reinscribing them on stelai placed in front of the Stoa Baileios (a process 
started in 409). The Assembly also elected a board of nomothetai to propose 
new laws to the Athenians, restoring and, in the process, reforming the 
constitution.4 Among the measures proposed by the nomothetai and ratified 
by the Assembly were rules creating a clear distinction between psephismata 
(decrees), measures passed by the Assembly and enacted either for a short 
period or for individuals, and nomoi (laws), permanent rules applying to 
all Athenians alike, which were instead passed through a new procedure 
called nomothesia. The new procedure involved a mandatory vote by the 
Assembly before any proposal for a new law could be proposed, publicity 
of the proposals, both in front of the monument of the Eponymous Heroes 
and through repeated reading in the Assembly, and the appointment of 
nomothetai who would then decide whether the new proposals would become 
law or not. A psephisma could be indicted through a graphe paranomon and 
repealed by a popular court, while a law could be repealed through a very 
similar procedure, the graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai (public action 
against an inexpedient law). This new system on the one hand was designed 
to maintain the stability of the laws and the constitution, which could not 
be overthrown by a simple vote in the Assembly as happened in 411 ([Arist.] 
Ath Pol. 29.2-3; Thuc. 8.67.1). At the same time, the new procedure provided 
a clear and consistent hierarchy of rules, as well as a definite procedure for 
revising and altering the laws of the city and for proposing new laws. This 
procedure was democratic because it was open to every Athenian citizen 
and promoted the rule of law by assuring consistency through the removal 
2. Cf. e.g. Harrison (1955), Robertson (1990), Rhodes (1991), Carawan (2002).
3. Cf. in the last fifty years in particular MacDowell (1975), Hansen (1979-80; 1985), Rhodes (1984), 
Piérart (2000) and Canevaro (2013).
4. Canevaro-Harris (2012).
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of contradictory laws.5
Some scholars have argued that whatever the nomothetai intended at the 
end of the fifth century when they devised this system, it had broken down 
by the middle of the fourth century when the Assembly was once again 
the unchecked legislative body of the Athenian state.6 This assumption is 
not supported by the evidence: there are nine epigraphical texts of laws,7 
and whenever it is possible to check, the enacting body are the nomothetai. 
Moreover the rules enacted in these laws are usually permanent norms 
valid for all Athenians, and the only temporary rules approved by the 
nomothetai appear to be financial arrangements. This is due to the fact 
that the allocation of the funds of the Athenian state was fixed by a law 
determining the merismos, and therefore any change in the allocations of 
the merismos had to be passed as a law, since no decree could have higher 
validity than a law. There is moreover no clear example in the epigraphical 
record of general permanent rules passed as psephismata in the fourth 
century. Hansen has surveyed also the literary evidence for laws and 
nomothetai in the fourth century down to the Lamian war, and shown that 
the Athenian adhered very strictly to their new rules about legislation.8
Whatever the disagreement about the details and even the nature of the 
fourth century legislative procedure, one can still agree that in the fourth 
century down to Lamian war there was a strict distinction between laws 
and decrees, a more complex procedure for enacting laws, which were 
not ratified by the Assembly, but by a body of nomothetai, multiple checks 
to guarantee the consistency of the ‘legal code’, and a judicial review of 
new enactments, both laws and decrees, which was however activated 
on a voluntary basis by an individual Athenian. But what happened after 
Athens lost its independence to Macedon? In the turbulent years following 
the Lamian war, through the multiple changes of regime, the many 
oligarchic (or pseudo-oligarchic) constitutions and the following (alleged) 
democratic restorations, did the Athenians preserve this complex and 
delicate legislative system? Was it ever repealed, and restored? Whatever 
happened in these years, scholars have sometimes simply assumed that 
the legislative procedures of the late fifth century were revived in 307 
together with most democratic constitutional features when Demetrius 
Poliorcetes freed Athens from the regime of Demetrius of Phalerum, and 
survived through the third century. For instance, Hansen relies on a 
partially published inscription (SEG 37.89) and argues that they continued 
into the third century, and O’Sullivan assumes their existence in the years 
immediately following the democratic restoration of 307.9 Most other 
scholars simply do not discuss the problem. 
5. Cf. Canevaro (2013).
6. E.g.  Busolt (1920: 458), Kahrstedt (1938: 12-8), Harrison (1955: 27), Quass (1971: 71).
7. In chronological order SEG 26.72; R. S. Stroud, The Athenian grain-tax law of 374/3 B.C.  (Hesperia 
Supplement 29) (Princeton 1998); Agora Excavations, inv. no. I 7495 (unpublished); IG II2 140; IG II2 
244; SEG 12.87; IG II2 334 + SEG 18.13; IG II2 333; SEG 35.83. Cf. also the regulations for the Mysteries at 
Eleusis in a fourth-century inscription (K. Clinton, Eleusis: The Inscriptions on Stone. Documents of the 
Sanctuary of the Two Goddesses and Public Documents of the Deme. Vol. IA: Text  [Athens 2005] no. 138 
and Vol. II: Commentary [Athens 2008] at 116).
8. Hansen (1978; 1979).
9. Hansen (1983: 206), O’Sullivan (2009: 214 n. 57). Cf. also Lambert  (2004: 109 n. 84).
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This article will examine and discuss the (scanty) relevant epigraphical 
and literary evidence for the years 322-301. It will attempt to interpret 
the changes in legislative practices in these years both within the 
framework of the wider constitutional changes occurred due to external 
shocks and Macedonian power, and in the light of previous developments 
and arrangements in nomothesia from the end of the fifth century. The 
Athenians (and their Macedonian overlords), when reforming legislative 
institutions after the Lamian war, responded to problems and needs 
dictated by their current political and constitutional circumstances, 
yet always acted within a tradition and consistently with assumptions 
about what is appropriate when it comes to legislation which had their 
roots in previous institutional arrangements. These, in the context of 
the various changes in legislative procedures in these years, played the 
role of blueprints, legitimizing and making recognizable to the Athenians 
solutions which were largely innovative.10 In detail, I shall argue that 
nomothesia as it was practised in the fourth century did not survive the 
limitation of the full-right citizens imposed by Antipater in 322, and that 
later Demetrius of Phalerum assumed himself the role of nomothetes, while 
at the same time using a board of nomophylakes (which replaced the graphe 
paranomon and the graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai) as a pre-emptive 
check on the legislative activity of the Assembly. When democracy was 
‘restored’ in 307 by Demetrius Poliorcetes the nomothetai found in our 
sources (their last attestation in the record) were not the same as the pre-
322 nomothetai, but rather a special board, possibly imposed by Demetrius 
himself, in charge of proposing laws for the purpose of facilitating the 
‘democratic transition’, and submitting them to the Assembly for approval. 
The old procedure of nomothesia, which provided a separate procedure for 
passing laws and multiple checks to assure the consistency of the laws of 
the city, was not revived in 307, and in all likelihood never reappeared in 
Hellenistic Athens.
Antipater’s regime and the first ‘restoration’
After Antipater’s victory at the battle of Crannon in 322 the Lamian 
War was over.11 Antipater forced each Greek city to negotiate individually, 
and the Athenians were among the last to enter negotiations. They sent 
10. The way I tackle these issues has been heavily influenced by the work of modern historical 
institutionalism (see the foundational essay, March-Olsen 1984, and 2006 for a synthesis), and in 
particular by what has been defined as ‘ideational historical institutionalism’: an approach parti-
cularly (and appropriately) popular in the study of public law (see e.g. Smith 2006 and Lieberman 
2002). Change in institutions must be explained in terms of gradual development, and described 
as the result of inherent features of both the relevant institutions and their relevant (embedded) 
ideas. Critical junctures when exogenous factors accelerated developments and brought about ra-
pid institutional change still saw new legislative solutions being created in accordance with persi-
stent legislative habits and shared ideas (if not ideals) of what is appropriate when creating laws. 
However, rather than providing an analysis structured around specific theoretical assumptions, I 
decided in this context to provide a reconstruction which is structured as a detailed analysis of the 
source material and does not depend on any specific theoretical preconceptions. The complexity 
of the sources, often rather sparse, and the need to assess thoroughly their reliability and their 
relationships make in this context such an approach necessary.
11. Cf. Habicht (1997: 36-42)
59The Twilight of Nomothesia
envoys to Thebes where the Macedonians were standing by ready to launch 
an invasion of Attica. The most important persons in this embassy were 
Phocion and Demades (whose citizen rights were reinstated for this very 
purpose), but Demetrius of Phalerum also makes an early appearance. 
Antipater required unconditional surrender, and the Athenian envoys, 
despite having been made plenipotentiary by the Assembly, went back to 
Athens to have the authorization to negotiate on these terms confirmed. 
Presumably it was by then quite clear that the final settlement would 
involve some substantial constitutional reform, and the envoys did not 
want to run the risk to be indicted for katalysis of the demos. Plutarch (Phoc. 
27.3) and Diodorus (18.18.3-4) provide us with the details of the agreement 
struck by the envoys: the Athenians were to enter philia and symmachia 
with Antipater, accept a garrison at Munichia, surrender the orators who 
had fomented the war, lose Oropus and, following a ruling by Perdiccas, 
Samos. Even more important, Antipater restricted citizenship to those who 
owned at least two thousand drachmas, which reduced number of citizens 
with full rights to 9000. The Athenians who lost rights as a result of this 
reform are estimated at 12000 by Plutarch, and 22000 by Diodorus.12 Such an 
imposition of constitutional reform is in line with what we see in the extant 
diagrammata with which Alexander and Ptolemy imposed constitutional 
changes to Chios, Tegea and Cyrene.13 The king would send a memorandum 
to which the city has to adhere in reforming particular institutions. 
Sometimes the diagramma goes into detail about the new constitutional 
arrangements, sometimes it only provides for the constitution to be made 
timocratic or democratic and has the citizen appoint suitable magistrates 
to take care of the transition.
In this case, even if we assume that Antipater imposed only the census of 
20 minas, this constitutional change must have involved a general reform 
of democratic institutions: it is unthinkable that democracy could have 
continued working as before after its citizen body was reduced by two thirds. 
9000 citizens over eighteen were certainly not enough to provide annually 
6000 citizens over thirty years old to act as judges in the lawcourts. The 
evidence for the institutional changes that occurred following these peace 
arrangements is scanty, but we must assume that they were extensive. Suda 
(s.v. Demades) reports that these changes brought about the destruction of 
the lawcourts and of the rhetorical contests. This piece of information is 
often discarded, and there is some possible evidence from this period for 
12. On these years see in general Habicht (1997: 42-53) and Tracy (1995: 7-30) and more in detail 
and with abundant bibliography Poddighe (2002). See also Williams (1983) and Dreyer (1999: 157-9) 
For recent discussions of the constitutional changes see e.g. Rhodes with Lewis (1997: 39-41) and 
Oliver (2003: 40-51) On these estimates see recently Van Wees (2011: 107-10): he argues convincin-
gly that both figures are ultimately unreliable, as they are both derived from Demetrius'census 
compared with the known figure of 9000 with citizenship rights under the regime of Antipater. 
Following his calculations, it is likely that 9000 conserved their rights out of a total citizen popula-
tion before the peace agreement of between 28000 and 32000..
13. Chios 32; IPArk 5; SEG 9.1. Cf. recently Bencivenni (2003: 11-2, 15-38, 79-104), RO 84 on the dia-
gramma for Chios, and Martini (2011) on that for Cyrene. Two decrees from Mytilene (SEG 36.750; 
SEG 40.673), as well as a dossier of documents from Eresus (IG XII.2 526), also refer to diagrammata 
from Alexander (cf. Bencivenni 2003: 39-78). This seems to be the standard mode by which Mace-
donian kings at this date imposed constitutional changes in the Greek poleis. 
60 Mirko Canevaro
lawcourt dokimasia in a grant of naturalization, which would show that the 
lawcourts did survive in some form.14 Nevertheless, it should be recognized 
that nothing like the judicial system in force through the fourth century 
could have survived such a reduction in the numbers of full-right citizens.15 
Once again, the constitutional changes here must have been extensive. This 
already suggests that some changes must have occurred in the legislative 
procedures: the judicial review on a voluntary basis of laws and decrees 
throught the graphe paranomon and the graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai, if 
it survived, must have lost much of its effectiveness, and must have been 
performed by a judicial board whose composition and selection methods 
were much different from the earlier fourth century. On the other hand, as we 
shall see, it is more likely that the profound institutional changes occurred 
in the three years of this regime were not hampered by the cumbersome 
procedure of nomothesia, and the graphe paranomon and the graphe nomon 
me epitedeion theinai most likely had been repealed straightaway together 
with the first reforms, to guarantee smooth constitutional restructuring, 
or else they simply stopped being used.
Changes must also have been implemented to deal with the significantly 
lower number of men who had a right to attend the Assembly. To give just a 
couple of examples, through the fourth century a law ordered that grants 
of citizenship to foreigners had to be ratified with a quorum of no less 
than 6000 voting by secret ballot ([Dem.] 59.89-90). The same quorum was 
a requirement to grant an atimos or state-debtor (or anybody else on his 
behalf) the right to address the Assembly (Dem. 24.45). Hansen has shown 
that out of a citizen body of around 30000 citizens the average number of 
citizens who attended most Assembly meetings must have been comfortably 
over such a quorum.16 With a severely reduced citizen body of around 9000 
such a quorum would have prevented any grant of citizenship or adeia to 
speak, and it is safe to assume that the validity of this rule was discontinued 
in these years, and the second vote on naturalization (attested e.g. by Agora 
16.101) was performed without a quorum. We have six extant naturalization 
decrees from these years.17 A further grant (IG II2 398), presumably from 
the year 319/8, shows that the ratification of the grants became at some 
point the task of a panel of judges. Osborne considers this an indication of 
a democratic constitution and attributes the decree to the period after the 
restoration of democracy. The prescript of the decree is not preserved, but 
this change in the practice of naturalization could as well be a late result 
of the reduction in the numbers of citizens: a procedure that could work 
only imperfectly with the reduced number of citizens was discontinued 
and eventually, perhaps after the restoration of democracy, replaced by a 
different one. In such matters, as well as in the composition and working 
of the lawcourts, even when we cannot conclusively find in the sources any 
clear evidence of changes and constitutional rearrangements, we should 
definitely postulate that such changes happened and were extensive, 
14. IG II2 387 (Osborne D36). This decree however is dated by Osborne to 319/8 after democracy 
had been restored. See also Rhodes with Lewis (1997: 40).
15. Cf. Banfi (2010: 14 n. 22); O’Sullivan (2009: 28).
16. Hansen (1983: 1-20).
17. Osborne D29-34.
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otherwise we could not make sense of how the Athenian state kept working 
between 322 and the royal decree of Polyperchon in the autumn of 319. 
Once again, it is very unlikely that in a context in which so many reforms 
of this nature were passed in a very short time (three years at the most), 
Athenians with full rights still retained the right to indict every new law 
for review in a law court. It is also improbable that every reform had to go 
through the complex nomothesia procedure followed earlier in the fourth 
century.
The selection of magistrates, their functions and their numbers, must also 
have been reformed following the introduction of the 20 minas requirement. 
In the fourth century the Athenians selected around 1200 magistrates 
every year (including the members of the Boule), of whom 1100 were selected 
by lot. All magistrates had to be more than 30 years old, and no Athenian 
could hold more than one office in a given year.18 Given that the selection 
of magistrates in Athens was held only among those who decided to run for 
office, and not among the whole citizen body, it must have been very difficult 
to find enough candidates to fill 1200 positions in a citizen body of 9,000. 
It must have been even more difficult to find in the poorest demes enough 
suitable candidates who owned more than 2000 drachmas for the Council, 
as the candidates  for the Council were nominated in the individual demes. 
In fact, we have some evidence that reforms in this area where performed: 
for example the office of the apodektai, widely attested until 323, disappears 
from our records afterwards.19 Diodorus (18.18.4) even seems to imply that 
selection by lot was abolished and magistrates were selected only through 
election, but the interpretation of this passage is controversial.20 The most 
famous of the reforms of these years is certainly the institution of the 
anagrapheus, who was probably elected and replaced the grammateus kata 
prytaneian selected by lot. This official must have been so important that 
in inscriptions of this period he even precedes the eponymous archon.21 
Once again, these many reforms, enacted in a very short period of time, 
are unlikely to have been subjected to the cumbersome fourth-century 
procedure of nomothesia. One further reform in this area, preserved in an 
inscription (IG II2 380), makes it virtually certain that nomothesia did not 
survive Athens’ defeat in the Lamian war. This inscription contains a statute 
proposed by Demades: because the duties of the astynomoi, in the Peireus at 
least, are transferred to the agoranomoi, the statute lists the new duties of 
these officials in policing the Peireus. This statute is clearly a general norm 
intended to be valid forever, and involves the ordinary (not special) duties 
of an ordinary office.22 Before 322 it would have surely been enacted by the 
nomothetai as a law, and yet this inscription reports a decree of the demos, 
18. Cf. Hansen (1991: 225-45).
19. Rhodes (1993: 591) suggests that also the diaitetai were abolished.
20. Oliver (2003: 50) doubts that the evidence can be conclusive on this respect, and believes sor-
tition was retained.
21. See Dow (1963) for the classic discussion on this topic, Henry (1977: 50-66) for a survey of the 
anagrapheus in inscriptions, and Rhodes with Lewis (1997: 37-40) for some usefull considerations.
22. Oliver (2003: 50-1 n. 41) has some doubts that this transfer of duties could have been as general 
as is usually assumed. It may indeed refer only to some of the old duties of the astynomoi, but the 
trasfer is not temporary and the measure is a general one, as the language of the inscription makes 
very clear.
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and the motion and enactment formulas are edoxen toi demoi and dedochthai 
toi demoi. That this statute was enacted as a decree of the Assembly is clear 
evidence that in 320 laws were no longer the province of a specific board of 
nomothetai, and were instead enacted in the Assembly as decrees. 
To sum up, not only the reduction in the number of citizens in the 
years 322-318 and the massive number of institutional and constitutional 
reforms that this made necessary make it very unlikely that the individual 
reforms had to go through the cumbersome procedure of nomothesia; a 
measure passed in these years, which would have been a nomos ratified by 
the nomothetai earlier in the fourth century, is enacted by the Assembly as a 
simple decree, which makes it virtually certain that the previous nomothesia 
procedures were discontinued following the defeat in the Lamian war.
Our sources for the short period of the restoration of democracy 
following the edict of Polyperchon are too scanty to allow us to follow the 
fate of the legislative procedures in Athens. Polyperchon issued his edict 
in autumn 319 and the Athenians returned to democracy in spring 318, 
around the last day of Xandicus (in the Macedonian calendar).23 Diodorus 
(18.55.2, 4, 56.3, 65.6) claims that the Athenians immediately overthrew the 
existing officials and restored the most democratic offices, yet a decree 
from the end of the year 319/8 that still mentions the anagrapheus rather 
than the grammateus shows that the Athenians did not immediately 
proceed to restore all the offices of the democracy, but rather let the year 
finish before fully restoring them.24 With the year 318/7 we find once again 
the grammateus instead of the anagrapheus, which indicates that the offices 
of democracy had been fully restored.25 We can assume that the census 
requirement for enjoying full citizen rights must also have been lifted. The 
grant of citizenship to Euphron of Sicyon, destroyed by the oligarchy and 
reinscribed by the democracy (IG II2 448), states that ‘now the demos has 
returned and has recovered the laws and the democracy’. To what extent 
this actually happened, and whether ‘the laws and the democracy’ were 
recovered to such an extent to include also the fourth-century legislative 
procedures, is difficult to say. Yet this restored democracy did not last long 
and by the summer of 317 a peace treaty with Cassander had appointed 
Demetrius of Phalerum in charge of the Athenian state and brought about 
other constitutional changes. Argumenta ex silentio are dangerous, but it 
must be noted that we have no evidence whatsoever for any systematic 
procedure of democratic restoration (similar to that of 403 or, as we shall 
see, of 307), with the actual enactment of laws restoring and reforming the 
constitution. In fact, such a systematic procedure is very unlikely, given 
the very short time this democratic regime survived. It could be the case 
that such a process was interrupted by the peace treaty with Cassander, 
and yet during the year and a few months of the regime something like 
that was actually in the process of being performed (despite the lack 
of evidence in our sources). Alternatively, since the oligarchic regime 
inaugurated by Antipater had lasted only under three years, it is possible 
23. See in general Habicht (1997: 47-53) and Rhodes with Lewis (1997: 40-1) for a discussion of the 
constitutional changes after the restoration of democracy.
24. IG II2 387 = Osborne D35.
25. Cf. IG II2 448 = Osborne D38.
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that the restoration of democracy was effected as a blanket restoration, a 
return to the status quo before the peace treaty with Antipater. If this was 
the case, it is not impossible that the old legislative procedures made a brief 
reappearance at this point, although there is no guarantee that they were 
actually used.
Demetrius’ regime
Whatever happened in this year and few months, the peace treaty 
with Cassander in summer 317 put an end to it. This peace agreement 
was negotiated by Demetrius of Phalerum, and although the text of the 
treaty is not preserved Diodorus (18.74.3-11) provides us with reliable 
information about its contents. This settlement made the Athenians allies 
of Cassander, with full control of their city, of Attica, of their revenues, of 
their fleet and of everything else. On the other hand the fort of Munichia 
would remain in Macedonian hands until the end of the current war, and 
the constitution would be reformed and made timocratic, with significant 
number of citizens losing their franchises, and only 21000 conserving 
their citizen status.26 Again a Macedonian king imposed constitutional 
changes on the city, in line with the provision of the extant diagrammata 
of the same years. This limitation of the full-right Athenian citizens must 
have again involved considerable changes in the working of the Athenian 
constitution, and yet we have only two inscriptions safely dated to the ten 
years before Demetrius Poliorcetes freed the city once again, not enough 
to discover much about such reforms, except that we find that the usual 
grammateus once again seems to disappear. In fact, the few inscriptions 
from this period do not mention any secretary, so it is hard to know what 
official performed the role.27 On the other hand, we have plenty of literary 
evidence for the new legislation enacted during this decade, which is 
attributed to Demetrius of Phalerum.28 The nature of Demetrius’ powers 
and the extent of his legislation as well as one particular office which 
seems to have been introduced by him, the nomophylakes strongly suggest 
that the legislative procedures typical of fourth-century democracy were 
either repealed or not restored by Demetrius.
I shall briefly discuss the powers Demetrius held during these ten years 
26. See in general Habicht (1997: 53-66) and the two recent monographs on Demetrius Banfi (2010) 
and O’Sullivan (2009). On Demetrius’ role in negotiating the peace, and on its conditions see for 
a survey of the sources and different accounts Banfi (2010: 53-7) and O’Sullivan (2009: 40-7). The 
information on Demetrius census comes from Athen. 272c. Diod. 18.74.3 adds that the property-
qualification was 1000 drachmas, but see recently Van Wees (2011) who has argued that this was 
the threshold only for the highest offices, and that the minimum property-qualification for the 
21000 citizens was between 300 and 500 drachmas.
27. IG II2 450 = D42; 451; 453 (cf. Rhodes with Lewis 1997: 42 nn. 41 and 42). See Tracy (1995: 36 
ss.), who argues however that the lack of inscribed decrees from these years is due to the attempt 
from Demetrius to reduce expenses and luxury (see also O’Sullivan 2009: 116-7 for a similar expla-
nation). Banfi (2010: 89-95) convincingly refutes this theory and argues that the reason is simply 
reduced activity of the Assembly.
28. See Banfi (2010: passim) and O’Sullivan (2009: passim) for Demetrius’ legislation.
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of government and how this affects our discussion, and then move to the 
significance of the office of the nomophylakes. In addition to imposing a 
change of the constitution in fact Cassander appointed an epimeletes, an 
overseer of the city of Athens. Cassander chose for this task the negotiator 
himself, Demetrius. Such offices are typical of Macedonian bureaucracy, 
and we find in early Hellenistic times overseers at Sardis, Ilium, Megalopolis, 
nominated by Alexander, Cassander and Antigonus.29 If this was the case 
with Demetrius, one wonders how this office was integrated into the 
Athenian constitution. Some scholars (in particular O’Sullivan) have argued 
that this office marked only the relationship between Demetrius and 
Cassander, yet had no particular validity in Athens. Demetrius, much like 
Pericles in the fifth century, governed and legislated through his personal 
influence, supported perhaps by pressure applied by the presence of a 
Macedonian garrison in Munichia.30 The problem with this interpretation 
is that a deme decree from Aixone (IG II2 1201), which honours Demetrius 
for his achievements from 317, in particular for securing the peace 
agreement with Cassander, reports, although in fragmentary fashion, that 
Demetrius was indeed elected by the Athenians to some kind of office. The 
passage in question states that Demetrius [--9-- αἱ]ρεθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμο[υ 
τοῦ ’Αθηναίων νόμους] ἔθ[η]κεν καλ[οὺς καὶ συμϕέροντας τεῖ πόλε]ι. Most 
of the restorations are uncontroversial: [--]ρεθεὶς must be restored into 
αἱρεθεὶς, and the demos must be that of the Athenians (surely he was not 
elected by the deme of Aixone). Likewise, it is clear that he νόμους] ἔθ[η]
κεν καλ[οὺς καὶ συμϕέροντας τεῖ πόλε]ι, an expression which is found 
elsewhere in similar fashion (cf. e.g. [Plut.] Vit. X Or. 852b; Agora 16.257.1 l. 
9; Agora 16.261.1 = IG II3 1292 l. 15). This means that Demetrius, once he was 
elected to some office (notice the participle), in that quality proceeded to 
legislate. There has been much speculation about what this office must 
have been. Some proposals (anagrapheus and thesmothetes) are too long to fit 
the 9-spaces lacuna, and anyway unlikely.31 Ferguson and Gehrke proposed 
strategos on the basis of a statue basis, IG II2 2971 which gives this title to 
a Demetrius son of Phanostratus from Phalerum, yet Tracy has recently 
shown that this inscription must be dated to the late third century, and 
refers to Demetrius’ grandson, and not to Demetrius himself.32
The two most likely restorations are epimeletes, following Diodorus’s 
account of the treaty with Cassander, and nomothetes. One problem with 
epimeletes is that it is ten letters long and would violate the stoichedon 
arrangement of the inscription. Another problem is that this is not an 
Athenian office, but rather a Macedonian one. A third problem is that 
29. Hammond (1985: 160 and passim).
30. O’Sullivan (2009: 40-6, 90-103 and passim). See also Tracy (1999) for a similar view. Against such 
interpretations see in particular Bayliss (2011: 61-93).
31. Cf. Dow-Travis (1943: 150) and Banfi (2010: 58-9) against these restorations. Thesmothetes is a 
normal office which does not carry any legislative power, while anagrapheus as the office of the 
early 310s was an elective office and changed every year, while as an office concerned with legi-
slation, as the inscription wants it, is the office held by Nicomachus in the late fifth century, but 
it involved only finding Solonian laws and submitting them to the Assembly for approval. Both 
offices are unlikely to have been those to which Demetrius was elected.
32. Ferguson (1911: 47 ff.) and Gehrke (1978: 137 ff.), but see Tracy (1995: 172-4), Banfi (2010: 60-2) 
and O’Sullivan (2009: 97).
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Diodorus explicitly says that Cassander nominated Demetrius epimeletes, 
whereas the inscription from Aixone states that he was elected by the 
Athenians to this office.33 The restoration nomothetes on the other hand is 
suggested by the inscription itself: after and because he was elected to the 
office (participle aorist) Demetrius proceeded to pass laws (νόμους] ἔθ[η]
κεν). This proposal is confirmed by plenty of external evidence: Syncellus 
(Dem. Phal. fr. 20 B Fortenbraugh), who calls Demetrius the third nomothetes 
of Athens after Solon and Draco, might be too late a source to be given 
too much credit, but the Marmor Parium (B 15-16, Ep. 13) records specifically 
that Demetrius νόμους ἔθηκεν. Moreover Plutarch (Arist. 27.3-5) reports 
that Demetrius himself in his work Socrates states that he granted the 
descendants of Aristides a small revenue νομοθετῶν, that is in quality of 
nomothetes. Duris (Demetrius 43a Fortenbaugh) must have alluded to this 
title when he claims that Demetrius lived a life anomothetos.
The case for Demetrius being elected to the office of nomothetes has been 
forcefully made by Dow and Travis, and although it is likely that no truly 
conclusive argument can be brought for or against this restoration, this 
remains the strongest proposal.34 It is not impossible, and in my opinion 
quite likely, that the peace treaty briefly summarized by Diodorus may 
have contained (or implied) that the Athenians should elect the epimeletes 
of Cassander to a suitable office to facilitate the transition to a timocratic 
constitution. At any rate, Plutarch’s citation of Demetrius’ words in the 
Socrates is at least clear evidence that Demetrius liked to characterize 
himself as a nomothetes, and as such he was later remembered. Strabo 
(9.1.20) formed the impression, apparently from reading Demetrius’ 
‘memoirs’ (hypomnemata), that he not only did not dissolve the democracy, 
but rather corrected it (ἐπενώρθωσε). This once again shows that Demetrius 
characterized his political action as that of a constitutional reformer, one 
who acted within the framework of the patrios politeia. He portrayed himself 
as a nomothetes like Draco and Solon while at the same time exploiting the 
long standing debate on the patrios politeia, which had been invoked since 
the late fifth century by reformers and aspirant reformers alike, whether 
of democratic or oligarchic belief. To confirm this, one should also point 
out that his most apologetic works deal with his constitutional reforms and 
with his legislation, and among his best attested scholarly interests we find 
laws and legislation. Banfi has also convincingly argued that in his work 
in five books περὶ τῆς Ἀθήνησι νομοθεσίας Demetrius not only dealt with 
various Athenian laws and institutions (e.g. the Assembly, the eisangelia, the 
demarchs, the duties of the resident aliens) but often, as with arbitration 
and parastasis, proceeded to criticize them and discuss the changes and 
reforms that he had introduced himself.35 Once again, the use of the word 
nomothesia in the title is circumstantial evidence that this was the office to 
33. Epimeletes is the restoration of Wilhelm in IG II2 1201 and has been more recently endorsed by 
Tracy (1995: 43-46), Dreyer (1999: 161 n. 205), Gagarin (2000: 348), Banfi (2010: 53-63), Paschidis 
(2008: 60-1). Haake (2008: 90, 98) also seems to accept that this was Demetrius’ title in Athens. 
Against this restoration see recently O’Sullivan (2009: 96-7).
34. This restoration, after Dow-Travis (1943: 148-59), has been recently endorsed by Rhodes with 
Lewis (1997: 41) and O’Sullivan (2009: 95-7).
35. Banfi (2010: 45-51).
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which Demetrius was elected. 
In fact, there is evidence (Chios 32 = RO 84) that in 334 Alexander sent 
a  diagramma instructing the Chians to elect nomographoi who would write 
and correct (grapsousi kai diorthosousi) the laws to effect a change in regime. 
In this case the regime was to be made into a democracy. His choice was 
apparently that of having local magistrates, bearing a recognizable office 
name, elected to reform the constitution, rather than impose specific 
changes and rules as we find in other diagrammata.36 A similar arrangement, 
with nomographoi in charge of creating new laws, seems to have been 
imposed by Antigonus to the Teans and the Lebedians at some date between 
306 and 302 (Teos 59): they also had to elect nomographoi to propose new 
laws.37 It is not inconceivable that Cassander not only appointed Demetrius 
of Phalerum the Macedonian epimeletes in Athens, but also ordered or 
recommended that he be elected nomothetes in order to write and correct 
the laws to facilitate the transition to a timocratic constitution. But even if 
we do not accept this, it is at least clear that Demetrius characterized his 
action as that of a nomothetes, and brought substantial changes to the laws 
of Athens over the whole period of his regency. In such a context it is very 
difficult to believe that he may have allowed a board of nomothetai to have 
the final word about his legislation, and every reform of his to go through 
such a cumbersome procedure for approval as laws did at least until 322. It 
is also hard to believe that he would characterize himself through a term 
that would technically mark him as a member of the board in charge of 
accepting or rejecting his legislation.
We have no way of knowing in what precise form Demetrius passed his 
legislation. There are only three extant public inscriptions from the decade 
of his power, and none of these can be described as a law. On the other 
hand, one particular board of officials that he created or whose powers he 
expanded, the nomophylakes, also suggests very clearly that no procedure of 
review of new laws such as fourth-century nomothesia was in place during 
the period of his power. As Banfi has convincingly shown, all fourth century 
sources, from Plato to Xenophon and Aristotle, agree that the nomophylakes 
were a typically aristocratic magistracy.38
The main source for their existence and their functions in Athens is the 
entry about these magistrates in the Lexicon Rhetoricum Cantabrigense (s.v.. 
νομοφύλακες), which draws extensively on Philochorus. The entry first 
of all specifies that these officials were not the same as the thesmothetai, 
then provides the source of this piece of information: the seventh book 
of Philochorus. This has been conclusively identified by scholars as the 
book dealing with Demetrius’ decade of power, which strongly suggests 
that Philochorus named these officials while describing one of Demetrius’ 
reforms.39  The entry then proceeds, following Philochorus, to show how the 
36. Cf. Magnetto (1997: n. 10) and Bencivenni (2003: 33-4). Laronde (1987: 85-128, 249-56) argues 
that the nomothetai mentioned at the end of SEG 9.1 had the same role: they had to propose new 
legislation along the lines indicated in his diagramma.
37. Cf. Bencivenni (2003: 193, 196, 199).
38. Banfi (2010: 142-5). It should be noticed that in the diagramma for Cyrene (SEG 9.1) Ptolemy also 
mentioned nomophylakes.
39. Cf. Jacoby (1949: 115); Pearson (1942: 11); Bearzot (2007: 51); O’Sullivan (2001: 51).
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nomophylakes are different from the thesmothetai: while the archons went up 
to the Areopagus wearing crowns, the nomophylakes wore headbands at the 
dramatic representations, sat before the archons and led the procession for 
Pallas. In addition to this, and more interestingly for our purposes, they 
controlled that the magistrates acted in accordance with the laws, and sat 
in the Council and in the Assembly together with the proedroi, preventing 
things inexpedient for the demos from being performed. The Greek here is 
revealing: the nomophylakes sat κωλύοντες τὰ ἀσύμϕορα τῇ πόλει πράττειν. 
The word ἀσύμϕορα brings to mind the procedure against inexpedient 
laws (nomon me epitedeion) which was indicted by ho boulomenos in the pre-
322 democracy, and their role seems here to be exactly that of performing 
a control on whether something paranomon or me epitedeion is passed in the 
Assembly. The difference of course is that rather than a democratic control 
performed on a voluntary basis in the popular lawcourts, they seem to 
perform a pre-emptive control on whether something can be discussed 
or not in the Assembly, as their seat alongside the proedroi suggests. They 
seem to have replaced the democratic procedures of judicial review with 
a discretionary power acting directly in the Council and the Assembly. 
Other sources, all drawing from the same passage of Philochorus, seem 
to confirm that they replaced, or at least were perceived as replacing, the 
graphe paranomon and the graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai. Harpocration 
(s.v.. νομοφύλακες), like the Lexicon Rhetoricum Cantabrigense, notes that the 
nomophylakes are different from the thesmothetai, and that Philochorus in 
book 7 states they were in charge of making sure that the magistrates acted 
in accordance with the laws. Pollux (8.94) reports that they were crowned 
with a white headband (which indentifies Philochorus as the source of the 
information) and confirms that they sat in the Assembly with the proedroi 
and prevented the voting of ἀσύμϕορα. Suda (s.v.. οἱ νομοφύλακες τίνες) 
reports the same pieces of information (including the differences between 
them and the thesmothetai, and their ritual roles), but its wording is even 
more significant: they κωλύοντες ψηϕίζειν, εἴ τι παράνομον αὐτοῖς εἶναι 
δόξειεν, ἀσύμϕορον τῇ πόλει. They prevented the Assembly from voting 
anything either paranomon or ἀσύμϕορον, that is me epitedeion.40
The sources therefore all agree that the nomophylakes assumed the role 
that was once performed by the graphe paranomon and the graphe nomon me 
epitedeion theinai, and replaced a democratic procedure based on voluntary 
action by the citizens and decision by the popular lawcourts with the 
discretionary power to block debate and legislation in the Council and the 
Assembly by a board of (probably elected) officials.41 If this is the case, then 
there can be no question that the existence of the nomophylakes not only 
excludes that graphe paranomon and graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai could 
have existed during this period but virtually guarantees that no legislative 
procedures like those of the pre-322 democracy could have survived 
Demetrius’ reforms. Nomothesia was performed individually by Demetrius, 
who acted much like the lawgivers of old, and the demos, far from having 
available any procedure for independent initiative in legislation, saw its 
40. Cf. Gehrke (1978: 154-5).
41. Cf. Gehrke (1978: 151-5). Cf. also Hansen (1974: 55).
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powers in this area severely curtailed by magistrates who could stop 
legislation in the Council and the Assembly before it could be debated and 
submitted to a vote. 
Of course, there have been attempts to argue that the nomophylakes were 
not created by Demetrius, and some scholars hold that the Demetrian 
nomophylakes had no constitutional powers, but were rather a magistracy 
exercising moral control over the Athenians. If this was the case, then we 
should be cautious to argue that their existence is evidence that the old 
legislative procedures had been eliminated. The first problem originates 
from a passage of Harpocration (s.v.. νομοφύλακες), where we read that 
the nomophylakes were mentioned in two speeches of Deinarchus, Against 
Himereus and Against Pitheas. The problem with this information is that 
these speeches of Deinarchus are usually dated to the 320s, and some 
scholars want therefore to predate the introduction of the nomphylakes 
accordingly to the regime of Antipater, or even to the Lycourgan age.42 
It must be noted however that there is no extant information about the 
actual date of these speeches, and they could as easily be dated to the 310s 
(there is no guarantee that this Himereus must be Demetrius’ brother, and 
not another relative still alive in the 310s). Moreover we have no context 
for the mention of the nomophylakes by Deinarchus: he could even refer to 
a magistracy outside Athens, (proposing its introduction etc.). Deinarchus’ 
mention cannot overweight the fact that these magistrates, their powers 
and their functions, were discussed by Philochorus in book 7, most likely in 
the context of Demetrius’ constitution.43 Finally, even if we were to accept 
that the nomphylakes were introduced before Demetrius’ regime, the fact 
that Philochorus discusses them extensively in his book 7 makes it virtually 
certain that Demetrius had a special interest for them, and reformed their 
role and their powers.44
The second issue is the interpretation advanced by O’Sullivan of the 
role of the nomophylakes: she uses a passage of Pollux (8.102) as evidence 
that the nomophylakes had no function in safeguarding the laws and the 
constitution.45 This passage states that the Eleven were called at the time of 
Demetrius nomophylakes. Their job was that of taking care of those in prison, 
of thieves, slave-dealers and robbers, of putting them to death (when they 
admitted to their crime) or bringing them before a law court. The door of 
their office (nomophylakiou), through which those convicted passed before 
being killed, was called the door of Charon. She links this passage with the 
statement at the end of the entry in the Lexicon Rhetoricum Cantabrigense, 
ascribed to Philochorus, that the nomophylakes were introduced by Ephialtes 
after he stripped the Areopagus of all his previous powers, to argue that the 
powers of constitutional control must be ascribed to the nomophylakes of the 
time of Ephialtes,46 while Pollux reports the real powers of the Demetrian 
42. Cf. e.g. De Sanctis (1913), Wallace (1989: 202 ff.), Humphreys (2004: 123-5). Jacoby (FGH 328 fr. 
64) dates their introduction to the Lycurgan period.
43. Cf. Banfi (2010: 150-3).
44. Cf. Gehrke (1978: 151-2)
45. O’Sullivan (2001 and 2009: 72-86).
46. Gagarin (2000: 352) also believes that it is more likely that the institution of the nomophylakes 
was reintroduced, rather than created, by Demetrius.
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nomophylakes. Cinzia Bearzot has recently brought several cogent objections 
against this interpretation.47 Here it will suffice to summarize her main 
points. First of all, there is no evidence whatsoever for nomophylakes in the 
fifth century, and it is unbelievable that such a powerful magistracy could 
simply disappear from our sources.48 Second, the reforms of Ephialtes are in 
general a topic for which fourth-century reconstructions have been shown 
to be dubious and often unreliable, and betray political aims relevant to the 
fourth century, rather than the fifth.49 In this specific case, it is easy to see, 
with Bearzot, how the invention of fifth-century nomophylakes may have 
helped to legitimize Demetrius’ reform and their introduction in the 310s. 
Finally, the passage of Pollux might well be corrupt and contain the term 
nomophylakes where the expected and correct term would be desmophylakes. 
Gehrke has already pointed out how in ancient lexicographical sources 
there was much confusion between nomophylakes and thesmophylakes, and 
between thesmophylakes and desmophylakes.50 Cinzia Bearzot has shown 
that at least the second mention of the nomophylakes (nomophylakiou) is not 
unequivocal in the tradition, and must be a corruption: a Scholion of Aretas 
of Caesarea on Plato’s Phaedrus (59c) quotes Pollux and has desmophylakiou 
and not nomophylakiou. Since Aretas had access to the archetype of Pollux, 
this passage is the oldest witness of the text of Pollux, and confirms that the 
passage dealt with desmophylakes. If this is the case, then also the mention of 
the nomophylakes at the beginning of the passage must be likewise corrupt.51
To sum up, there is no reason to believe that the nomophylakes were not 
created (or at least their role reformed) by Demetrius of Phalerus, nor to 
think that their functions were different from those described by the 
Lexicon Rhetoricum Cantabrigense, Harpocration and Suda. The nomophylakes 
performed a pre-emptive control of constitutionality on the initiatives of 
the Council and the Assembly, in fact replacing the graphe paranomon and the 
graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai. Their existence and their role are evidence 
that under Demetrius the pre-322 legislative procedures were no longer 
in force. Demetrius’ office, nomothetes, was meant to legitimize and make 
his legislative action acceptable to the Athenians by implying continuity 
with previous legislative institutions and traditions of legislation, yet the 
institutional arrangements of legislation under Demetrius were in fact 
largely innovative. An institution such as the nomophylakes was alien to the 
Athenian tradition, and produced a model of nomothesia alternative to the 
previous democratic ones.
Demetrius Poliorcetes and the last nomothetai
Demetrius’ regime did not survive the end of its first decade, when 
Demetrius Poliorcetes conquered Munichia and announced the liberation 
47. Bearzot (2007). Humphreys (2004: 124 n. 44) and Banfi (2010: 157-61) also reject O’Sullivan’s 
thesis.
48. Cf. Banfi (2010: 147-8). Pace Cawkwell (1988).
49. Cf. Gehrke (1978: 51-2 n. 6), Bearzot (2007: 41 ff.) and  Banfi (2010: 146-9).
50. Gehrke (1978: 188). Cf. also Banfi (2010: 159-60).
51. Bearzot (2007: 145 ff.). On Aretas and Demetrius' archetype see Bethe’s preface to his edition 
of Pollux at p. VI.
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of Athens in 307.52 Diodorus (20.45.5, 46.3) states that after fifteen years of 
Macedonian control, started with Antipater, the Athenian demos regained 
its freedom and got back its patrios politeia. Plutarch (Demetr. 10.2) confirms 
that in the fifteenth year they recovered their democracy. In fact, the form of 
democracy in power before the Lamian War was not restored in its totality, 
with a blanket measure. In terms of institutional development, and given 
the working of constitutional change in those years, this would have been 
impossible: every regime had probably proceeded to destroy the actual 
texts of some of the laws of the previous regime, and we should not think 
of these changes as orderly restructuring which left previous arrangement 
in stand-by, but neatly archived and ready to be recovered and made once 
again valid. If a blanket restoration is conceivable in 318, only three years 
after Antipater had overthrown the constitution, it is hard to conceive 
that after ten years of rule by Demetrius of Phalerum, who brought about 
enormous changes in the Athenian laws and constitution, and after fifteen 
years since Athens lost its freedom, the Athenian could simply decide to go 
back to the patrios politeia, whatever they thought this to be. A democratic 
constitution had to be reconstructed through active legislation, and there 
is no guarantee that all the offices and institutions of the old democracy 
were revived.53 In some areas we know that the new regime proceeded to 
restore old offices: we find once again the grammateus kata prytaneian, and 
we find the astynomoi (IG II2 652), an office which had been replaced under 
Antipater’s regime. On the other hand, the office of agonothetes was not 
repealed (cf. e.g. IG II2 3073, 3074, 3077, 649),54 and choregia was not revived, 
and more importantly two tribes were added to the Cleisthenic ten, which 
must have involved substantial changes in the numbers of Councillors as 
well as in the boards of magistrates appointed on a tribal base.55
The years of the ‘restoration of democracy’ under Demetrius Poliorcetes 
are particularly important for our purpose, and will be the last ones to be 
extensively discussed. First, because they are the last period of Classical 
and early Hellenistic Athenian history for which abundant if patchy 
literary sources supplement the information we find in inscriptions. 
Second, the dating of the inscriptions themselves, at least in many cases, 
is for these years still safe, and the sequence of archons is still reported 
by Diodorus. Third, it is in these years that we last find a mention of 
nomothetai, and it depends from our understanding of these nomothetai 
whether we can postulate that the pre-322 legislative procedures were 
ever revived, and could have been used in the third century. After 301 
nomothetai are never found again in the record (with only one possible yet 
very unlikely exception), which would suggest that they never existed 
again in Hellenistic Athens, in any form. This argumentum ex silentio is 
52. Cf. in general Habicht (1997: 67-81).
53. Cf. Ferguson (1911: 95-107) and more recently Rhodes with Lewis (1997: 42-5) for a discussion 
of the constitutional changes after Demetrius of Phalerum’s fall. 
54. Wilson – Csapo (2012) argue that the office of agonothetes was in fact created in 307, which 
would constitute another example of restoration of democracy through active legislation, one that 
did not restore old institutions but rather created new ones. On the other hand, this reconstruction 
is problematic, and it is safer to believe that this innovation was due to Demetrius of Phalerum.
55. For all these changes see Rhodes with Osborne (1997: 42-5).
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however weakened by the fact that if one looks through all the extant 
third century inscriptions he finds not a single unequivocal case of an 
enactment of general value for all Athenians meant to be valid forever. 
All the extant measures inscribed in the third century, at least as far I 
have been able to see, would have been in the fourth passed as decrees. 
Therefore the fact that all of them were enacted by the Council or the 
Assembly cannot be used as a conclusive argument against the existence 
of a separate procedure for passing nomoi in the third century. In such an 
evidentiary context, understanding what the nomothetai under Demetrius 
Poliorcetes were is key for advancing an hypothesis about their survival in 
the third century: if an ordinary board of nomothetai, part of an ordinary 
procedure for passing nomoi, was revived in these years, then it is at least 
possible that they might have performed some role in the third century, 
whether they were preserved or were at certain points revived as part of 
one of the ‘democratic restorations’. If on the other hand the nomothetai 
at the end of the fourth century were not an ordinary board like those 
of the pre-322 democracy, part of a separate procedure for passing nomoi 
which made them more difficult to enact and alter, but rather a special 
magistracy which dealt with constitutional reform or ‘restoration’ after 
the fall of Demetrius of Phalerum, then the picture becomes significantly 
different. If the passing of nomoi remained also in these years the 
province of the Council and the Assembly, then it becomes very unlikely 
that the existence of a separate procedure for passing nomoi was ever 
again considered an option in the constitutional debate of the fourth 
century. The next unequivocally attested restoration of democracy, in 
287, for which the information is scanty at best, happened 35 years after 
the last appearance of a separate procedure for passing nomoi, 35 years 
dense with constitutional changes, rearrangements, modifications of the 
role and name of magistracies and institutions, in a State that probably 
did not keep orderly records of all the previous laws and constitutional 
arrangements that had been repealed, and often actively recurred to 
damnatio memoriae of previous regimes. It is very likely that by then the 
need for separate procedures for passing laws had all but disappeared 
from the constitutional debate, replaced by considerations about the role 
of the popular Assembly which considered any limitations of its powers 
as undemocratic. Understanding the role of the nomothetai of Demetrius 
Poliorcetes’ restoration of 307 is not only key for understanding the nature 
of this restoration, but is, before new epigraphical evidence is discovered, 
our best chance to advance a plausible hypothesis about nomothesia in the 
third century.
We have one certain attestation of the nomothetai in the epigraphical 
record: IG II2 487 honours Euchares of Conthyle for his work under 
the archonship of Pherecles (304-3) in the anagraphe of the laws οἱ 
νενομοθετημένοι.56 The use of νενομοθετημένοι makes it certain that the 
laws mentioned here are those that have gone through a procedure of 
56. Notice that he is honoured as the anagrapheus ton nomon, he is not a nomothetes, pace Bayliss 
(2011: 103 ‘one of the nomothetai’). At p. 104 Bayliss rightly calls Euchares the ‘secretary of the no-
mothetai’. These however are not the same thing.
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nomothesia involving nomothetai.57 Euchares took care of their anagraphe 
ὅπως ἂν ἐκτεθῶσι πάντες […] σκοπεῖν τῶι βουλομένωι καὶ μηδὲ εἷς ἀγνοεῖν 
τοὺς τῆς πόλεως νόμους. Ferguson interpreted the role of these nomothetai, 
according to what was in his day the current explanation of the events 
of the restoration of democracy at the end of the fifth century, as that of 
performing a full revision of the ‘code of laws’ of Athens after the decade 
of Demetrius of Phalerum, going through every single old law and deciding 
whether it should be confirmed or not.58 Yet Edward Harris and I have shown 
that the anagrapheis at the end of the fifth century were given the task 
of going through the laws of Solon and presenting them to the Assembly 
for approval. The nomothetai at the time did not vote on old laws, nor did 
they ratify law proposals. They were rather concerned with presenting 
new bills to the Assembly for the purpose of restoring and reforming the 
constitutional arrangement of the Athenian state.59 Following their action, 
and one of their reforms, in the fourth century a board of nomothetai was 
then in charge of voting on new laws and enacting them.60 It is far from 
clear, and would be in fact unprecedented, if in the last decade of the fourth 
century these laws νενομοθετημένοι were old laws that were confirmed by 
the nomothetai. 
In fact we have positive evidence that these nomothetai dealt with new 
laws: Diog. Laert. 5.38, Athen. 13.610e-f and Poll. 9.42 all refer to a measure 
proposed by a Sophocles, which must be dated to 307/6, that imposed that all 
philosophical schools in Athens should be approved by the Athenian Council 
and Assembly, and otherwise be closed down.61 Such a measure can safely be 
described as a law. Following the enactment of this measure Theophrastus 
had to leave Athens. We will come back to the constitutional aspects of the 
enactment of this measure, but right now it is important to point out that 
its approval involved the nomothetai. A fragment of Alexis’ Hippeus (fr. 99), 
which was probably spoken by an old man or a paedagogus, reads: ‘May the 
gods grant many blessings to Demetrius / and the nomothetai, for they have 
thrown the men / who transmit to our youth the power of discourse, as 
they call it, / out of Attica to the crows’ (tr. O’Sullivan). In the previous line 
the fragment even refers to the Academy. This fragment makes clear that 
the nomothetai were involved with Sophocles’ enactment, and therefore 
57. Cf. I Orop 297 = IG II3 347 from 332/1 where Phanodemus is honoured for his legislative activity 
and the same verb nomothetein is used to indicate that the law went through nomothesia (in this case 
pre-322 nomothesia). Cf. Lambert (2004: 106 and 109 n. 84).
58. Ferguson (1911: 103-7) brings as further evidence of a full revision of the ‘code’ a passage of 
Polybius (12.13.9-12) that reports Demochares’ crtiticism of Demetrius of Phalerum. The passage 
ends in Ferguson’s translation with the words ‘And a fine set of laws this blondined Solon has 
drawn up. Let them be revised at once’. This would indeed be evidence of a revision of the ‘code’ 
of laws, yet these last two sentences are nowhere to be found in Polybius (cf. Gagarin 2000: 351 n. 
11).  Habicht (1997: 70, 73-4) seems to accept Ferguson’ interpretation and states that ‘the entire 
code of laws was published’, but does not discuss the matter any further. Marasco (1984: 43-4) and 
Hedrick (2000a and 2000b) also explicitly endorse this interpretation. Gagarin (2000: 364) rejects 
instead Ferguson’s theory and considers more likely that these nomothetai proposed new laws, but 
makes this statement only in passing, without arguing the point.
59. Canevaro – Harris (2012: 110-6).
60. Cf. Canevaro (2013).
61. For the date of the measure cf. Arnott (1996: 858-9). Cf. Haake (2007: 16-43 and 2008) for its 
provisions and rationale.
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their task was not that of going through, revising and confirming the old 
laws; they rather dealt with new bills, whether proposing them or voting 
on them is still unclear.
Once we have established that in all likelihood the nomothetai dealt with 
new laws, we are left with two alternatives: they could either be a body 
like the pre-322 board of nomothetai, in charge of voting on and ratifying 
new laws, as many scholars have in recent years assumed,62 or they could 
resemble the nomothetai of the late fifth century, in charge of proposing new 
laws and reforming the constitution after a period in which democracy was 
overthrown. In the first case, they would be an ordinary board, and their 
reappearance would be evidence that the pre-322 nomothesia was revived in 
307/6. In the second case however they would be a special magistracy with 
the task of creating new laws (or even redrafting old ones) with the purpose 
of restoring the democracy. It is likely that the Assembly, like at the end of 
the fifth century, would have had the final word on their proposals. 
To suggest a tentative answer to this question we need to move back to 
IG II2 487. If we were to assimilate the nomothesia there discussed with the 
procedures pre-322, we would find significant difficulties. The inscription 
mentions nomoi three times in relation to the work of anagraphe of Euchares, 
which makes it clear that his job was concerned exclusively with laws. He 
was an anagrapheus ton nomon.63 The expression σκοπεῖν τῶι βουλομένωι 
καὶ μηδὲ εἷς ἀγνοεῖν τοὺς τῆς πόλεως νόμους, if read in the light of pre-322 
evidence, should refer to temporary records. Hedrick has shown that the 
expression σκοπεῖν τῶι βουλομένωι is found eight times before this date 
and it always refers to impermanent media, such as wooden tablets. It is 
used this way by Dem. 24.18 about bills to be presented to the nomothetai for 
approval: these must be set out by the proposer in front of the monument 
of the Eponymous Heroes ‘for anyone who wishes so to see them’.64 If this 
is the case also for the task of Euchares as anagrapheus, we can already 
find here a significant difference with pre-322 nomothesia: in the procedure 
described in Dem. 20 and 24 it was the task of the proposer of a new law 
to give it publicity, and there was no official in charge of preparing the 
temporary record to be set out in front of the monument of the Eponymous 
Heroes (Dem. 24.25; 20.94). The existence now of such an official would 
suggest that proposing new laws is the task of state officials, with their 
own special anagrapheus. If on the other hand we interpret the anagraphe 
ton nomon as the task of setting up the inscriptions reporting the new laws, 
then the difference with pre-322 practice is even more striking: laws were 
previously inscribed by the grammateus tes boules (by the year 363/2 this 
official was no longer a member of the boule, and stood in office for a whole 
year; the term grammateus kata prytaneian from this date is interchangeable 
62. See e.g. Ferguson (1911: 104-7) endorsed by Hedrick (2000a); Dow – Travis (1943: Green (1990: 
49); Arnott (1996: 263); Millet (2007: 25); Haake (2008: 96).
63. Pace Paschidis (2008: 97), who calls Euchares ‘anagrapheus of the council’. At n. 5 he mentions 
Rhodes (1972: 138 n. 7) in support of considering Euchares ‘anagrapheus of the council’, yet Rhodes 
makes the opposite point, that the anagrapheus ton nomon at IG II2 487 is not to be confused with 
homonymous secretaries of the Council.
64. Hedrick (2000a and 2000b: 331-3).
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with grammateus tes boules).65 He was the same official in charge of inscribing 
decrees, and there was no special official in charge of inscribing new laws. 
To give only one example, the law of Eucrates, passed exactly thirty years 
before our inscription, entrusts the grammateus tes boules with setting up two 
inscriptions, one at the entrance of the Areopagus and one at the entrance 
of the Bouleuterion (Agora 16.73 ll. 23-6). The reason for which there was no 
special official in charge of inscribing laws is probably that not enough laws 
were passed every year to justify his existence: Dem. 24.142, in a passage in 
which he is clearly exaggerating for the purpose of showing that politicians 
legislate too often, states that Athenian rhetores legislate ‘almost every 
month’ (πρῶτον μὲν ὅσοι μῆνες μικροῦ δέουσι νομοθετεῖν). In this speech 
Demosthenes argues that Timocrates enacted a law to protect his friends, 
and carries on arguing that politicians are debasing nomothesia by using 
it incorrectly and far too often. In the previous paragraph Demosthenes 
gives as an example to be followed that of the Locrians, who passed only 
one law in two hundred years. It is clear that the number of laws per year 
given by Demosthenes, almost one per month, is inflated, but even if we 
were to accept Demosthenes’ statement, we would be left with about 10-12 
laws a year. Hardly enough to justify an official expressly concerned with 
inscribing them. This is why with pre-322 nomothesia the grammateus tes 
boules (or kata prytaneian) was in charge of inscribing both decrees and laws. 
After the restoration by Demetrius Poliorcetes the office of anagrapheus, in 
charge of inscribing the decrees, if it existed under Demetrius of Phalerum, 
ceases to exist, and the grammateus kata prytaneian is restored. IG II2 487 
itself is inscribed by this official. The existence of an additional anagrapheus 
ton nomon (or a board of them), whose task is preparing temporary records 
of proposals for new laws to be set out in front of the Eponymous Heroes, or 
that of inscribing the laws once they had been ratified, marks a significant 
difference with pre-322 nomothesia. First of all, it points to a very high 
volume of legislation at least between 307/6 and 304/3, much higher than 
with the previous legislative procedures, perhaps comparable with that of 
the restoration of democracy at the end of the fifth century. This makes 
sense because  at this point nomothetai were dealing with new laws for the 
purpose of restoring democracy after Demetrius’ regime. Second, it suggests 
that what we are dealing with at this point is not legislation initiated by 
average citizens, but rather state-directed legislation, coming out steadily 
from the systematic work of a board and steadily posted and inscribed by 
a dedicated anagrapheus as is enacted. The kind of procedure this analysis 
of IG II2 487 suggests is therefore a special procedure of legislation, initiated 
for the purpose of enacting new laws that would undo or at least reform 
in democratic sense Demetrius of Phalerum’s legislative action. It is not an 
ordinary and rather cumbersome procedure for legislation such as the pre-
322 one.  Such a procedure would have hampered, rather than facilitated, 
the enactment of new laws. It is safer therefore to believe that the nomothetai 
were at this point a board of magistrates in charge of implementing new 
laws for the purpose of democratic restoration, much like the nomothetai of 
the late fifth-century, and not a body whose job was to listen to proposals 
65. Cf. Rhodes (1972: 134-41; 1981: 599-605) and Henry (2002: 91-4).
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for new laws and approve or reject them.66 
The law of Sophocles about the philosophical schools, provides some 
further confirmation that the nomothetai were not in 307 the same 
institution as in the pre-322 democracy, and to find out who enacted 
the new laws proposed by this special board of nomothetai. According to 
Athenaeus (13.610e-f) Sophocles drove out the philosophers from Attica 
through a psephisma, which was then indicted by Philon, the pupil of 
Aristoteles. This would mean that the measure, according to Athenaeus a 
decree, was indicted through a graphe paranomon. At the trial Demochares, 
the nephew of Demosthenes, spoke in defence of the decree. Athenaeus’ 
words are striking, because we would expect a measure such as Sophocles’ 
to be enacted as a nomos, and not as a psephisma. In fact Pollux (9.42), 
when discussing the same measure, calls it a nomos. Diogenes Laertius 
(5.38) provides the fullest account, and states that ‘Sophocles the son of 
Amphiclides proposed a law that no philosopher should preside over a 
school except by permission of the Council and the Assembly, under penalty 
of death’. Diogenes seems to side with Pollux, and Athenaeus’ psephisma to 
be simply a mistake. Yet Diogenes Laertius then continues: ‘The next year, 
however, the philosophers returned, as Philo had prosecuted Sophocles for 
making an illegal proposal. Whereupon the Athenians repealed the law, 
fined Sophocles five talents, and voted the recall of the philosophers.’ The 
so-called ‘law’ is repealed through a graphe paranomon, and not through 
a graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai as nomoi should be. It seems to be 
unclear in the sources whether this ‘law’ of Sophocles was in fact a nomos 
or psephisma, and the inconsistencies have been sometimes attributed to 
mistakes in the antiquarian tradition.67 This is certainly possible, but we 
should countenance the possibility that the confusions may be due to the 
nature of the enactment itself. Similar confusions, as Hansen has clearly 
shown,68 are very common in laws of the few years following the democratic 
restoration of 403, when a new legislative procedure that gave a board of 
nomothetai the task of voting on new laws had not yet been created, but 
nomothetai were nevertheless in charge of proposing the laws, which were 
then approved by the Assembly. Enactments of these years are often called 
intermittently in our sources nomoi and psephismata. We know from the 
66. Errington (in Lambert 2004: 109 n. 84) suggests that a honorary decree (IG II2 433 + SEG 16.57) 
where the honorands are usually restored as thesmothetai may instead be concerned with nomothe-
tai. He rightly points out that thesmothetai never seem to be honoured as a board. Lambert on the 
other hand observes that a honour for the nomothetai as the pre-322 board in charge of approving 
new laws is also unparalleled, and would be unexpected, as the nomothetai were strictly speaking 
a constitutionally superior bode whose only job was to ratify or reject laws proposed by others. 
He allows however for the possibility that these may be nomothetai in the sense that they propo-
sed laws, as Phanodemus nenomotheteken for the Penteteric Amphiaraia (IG VII 4253) in 332/1. We 
would still however have to explain why more than one proposer is honoured in the same decree. 
On the other hand, if these are the nomothetai created in 307, then a collective honorary decree for 
the board as a whole would make sense, since these would be the nomothetai appointed for making 
proposals for new laws and submitting them to the Assembly for approval. On the other hand, the 
inscription is too fragmentary, and the dating too dubious, to afford us any safe conclusion on this 
matter.
67. Cf. e.g. O’Sullivan (2009: 214 n. 57) and Korhonen (1997: 78). Haake (2008: 95 and 101; cf. also 
2007: 18 n. 26) also notices the inconsistencies in the evidence, and claims that the problem cannot 
be solved given the state of our sources.
68. Hansen (1978: 319-20).
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fragment of Alexis that nomothetai were involved in the enactment of the 
‘law’ of Sophocles. If they were involved as the body in charge of ratifying 
the law, as is often assumed, that the law would have contained the formula 
dedochthai tois nomothetais or something similar, and any confusion would 
be difficult to explain. If on the other hand the nomothetai were in charge 
of proposing new laws, which were later ratified by the Assembly, as in 
the late fifth century, and Sophocles was one of them, then it is clear why 
the law could be attacked through a graphe paranomon and mistaken for a 
psephisma.69
There is in fact some further evidence that laws (general enactments 
valid forever) were ratified by the Assembly in these years. When in 303 
a court fined Cleomedon, a supporter of Demetrius, Demetrius sent a 
letter and had the fine cancelled. The Athenians then in the Assembly 
voted that no citizen should bring a letter from Demetrius, but Stratocles 
eventually passed a further measure which ordered that whatever 
Demetrius commands should be just before gods and men (Plut. Dem. 24.3-
5). Stratocles’ measure is quoted by Plutarch and has the formula dedochthai 
toi demoi, which characterizes this as a psephisma. Yet strictly speaking this 
would be a rule of general application (whatever he orders, to whomever, 
about whatever topic) meant to be valid for a long time, which in fact 
gives Demetrius full sovereignty over the Athenian Assembly, and forces 
the Assembly to ratify whatever he asks. The sort of law that should be 
ratified by the nomothetai, if the nomothetai were in charge of ratifying 
laws.70 Another interesting enactment is that passed by the Athenians after 
the battle of Ipsos: they resolved in the Assembly that no king should be 
allowed in Athens (Plut. Demetr. 30.3). It is unclear whether this is a measure 
meant to be valid only in the context after the battle, or was supposed to 
be a general rule valid for the future, as most scholars hold.71 If this second 
option is the case, we have here another example of ‘law’ that should have 
been enacted by the nomothetai and was instead passed in the Assembly. 
Another piece of evidence that could suggest that the nomothetai were at 
no point after the restoration of 307 given the task of ratifying new laws 
is IG II2 463, a decree of the Assembly usually dated to 307/6 and attributed 
to Demochares of Leuconoe that enacts a four-years long program of work 
on the walls of Athens and Peiraeus, lists specifications and assigns the 
work to contractors.72 Such an enactment should not strictly speaking be a 
nomos, and yet a similar one passed in 337, IG II2 244, was passed as a law. It is 
difficult to tell why one was passed as a law and the other was not, and the 
reason may be that the older one contained financial arrangements that 
required approval by the nomothetai. On the other hand it is very unclear 
whether the reason for which IG II2 244 was enacted as a law is that it 
69. Arnott (1996: 263) mentions the possibility that Sophocles may have been one of the nomo-
thetai, and notes that Meinecke and Kock both thought that Alexis was referring (loosely) to So-
phocles. Habicht (1997: 73) writes that the law was approved by the Assembly (which is probably 
correct) but does not discuss the problem.
70. About this episode cf. e.g. Habicht (1997: 78-9) and Paschidis (2008: 95-8), who reads this as an 
episode in a wider movement of resistance to Demetrius which developed in the first half of 303.
71. Cf. Ferguson (1911: 124-6); Habicht (1997: 81); Thonemann (2005: 64).
72. For the date see e.g. Maier (1959: 56-7), Merker (1986: 47-8); Dreyer (1999: 91, 124); Conwell 
(2008: 163-4).
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contained financial arrangements, and moreover IG II2 463 is fragmentary, 
and there is no guarantee that it lacked similar provisions. 73 To sum up, the 
scanty evidence from these few ‘laws’ enacted as psephismata in the years 
following Demetrius Poliorcetes’ restoration may not prove conclusively 
that laws were at this point enacted by the Assembly, and therefore the 
nomothetai did not ratify but rather proposed laws. Yet coupled with the 
evidence from IG II2 487 and the tradition about the law of Sophocles, they 
strongly suggest that this was the case. 
A further element in the fragment of Alexis needs at least some tentative 
explanation: we have seen that this fragment attributes the initiative of 
the law of Sophocles against philosophical schools to Demetrius and the 
nomothetai. This, apart from confirming once again that their role was 
proactive rather than passive, suggests some kind of special link between 
the nomothetai and Demetrius, as if they acted on his orders, or their 
institution was somehow linked with his will.74 Alexis may here be simply 
trying to tease Demetrius for meddling in the legislation of the city, and 
the nomothetai for being servile to his will. Yet we have seen above that 
a Macedonian king, Alexander, had in 334 imposed on the Chians the 
election of nomographoi to write and correct the laws towards a democratic 
constitution (Chios 32 = RO 84). Even more striking is the similarity of our 
nomothetai, according to the interpretation of their role I have offered, with 
the nomographoi imposed by Antigonus between 306 and 302 on the Teans 
and Lebedans (Teos 59): in the very same years of the action of the nomothetai 
in Athens Demetrius’ father imposed that Teos and Lebedos should elect 
three nomographoi each, over forty years old, incorruptible. These men 
should swear an oath and then write (that is propose) the laws that they 
consider most expedient and fair to both cities for the new synoecized 
city within six months from their election. They should submit their 
proposals for laws to the demos, therefore to the Assembly, for ratification. 
If a citizen wants to propose a law, he must submit it to the nomographoi, 
who will then submit it to the Assembly, together with those of their own 
making. The laws about which the nomographoi disagree must be sent to 
Antigonus himself for review and approval. The laws that are approved by 
the Assembly should also be sent to the king, specifying which ones have 
been proposed by the nomographoi and which ones by other citizens, so that 
the king may punish the nomographoi if they have proposed bad laws.75 The 
similarity of this procedure with what we have reconstructed of the role of 
the nomothetai in Athens between 307/6 and 301 is striking. The nomographoi 
in Teos and Lebedos (and presumably in Chios) proposed new laws, like 
our nomothetai, to effect the required change in the constitution, and then 
73. Humphreys (2004: 122 n. 40) notes this, but does not discuss the circumstances. For discussions 
of this law see Maier (1959: 48-67); Conwell (2008: 161-5)
74. Haake (2008: 96) believes that Demetrius was mentioned only because without him freeing the 
city the democratic procedure that led to the approval of Sophocles’ law would not have been pos-
sible. This explanation seems tenuous: the mention of the nomothetai as authors of the law is pre-
cise in institutional terms, and the connection of Demetrius with their action is explicitly stressed 
in verses 2 and 3 of the fragment. Demetrius is directly connected to the law of Sophocles as one 
of those who wanted it, not indirectly as the man who restored democracy and made discussion 
of such a law possible.
75. Cf. Bencivenni (2003: 169-202).
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submitted their proposals to the Assembly for ratification. Theirs was not 
an ordinary magistracy, but rather a special one created to effect a major 
constitutional change imposed by a king. It has been argued that another 
board with similar functions was also imposed by Ptolemy on Cyrene (SEG 
9.1), yet this time the officials are not called nomographoi, but nomothetai 
like in Athens.76 We cannot exclude the possibility that something similar 
happened in Athens when Demetrius Poliorcetes ‘freed’ the city.77 He may 
have restored democracy not simply by expelling Demetrius of Phalerum 
from Athens and giving back the Athenians their sovereignty. There is 
the possibility, and even the likelihood given the parallel with his father’s 
arrangements in Teos, that he actively restored the democracy by imposing 
the election of nomothetai that would write and correct the laws to perform 
this constitutional transition.78
To sum up, the nomothetai of these years, their last appearance in the 
record, were probably not the same as the pre-322 ones: they were not 
an ordinary magistracy, and they are not evidence that the restored 
democracy reinstated an ordinary separate procedure for enacting nomoi. 
Nomoi kept being enacted by the Assembly like psephismata. Accordingly it 
is safe to say that although the graphe paranomon was reintroduced by the 
restored democracy, the graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai was not. Nomoi 
and psephismata were enacted in the same fashion, and therefore did not 
require separate procedures for the lawcourts to rescind them. A law like 
the law of Sophocles could be repealed through a graphe paranomon. The 
nomothetai after 307, one of whom must have been Sophocles, were on the 
other hand a board of officials created to draft and submit to the Assembly 
for approval new laws for the purpose of restoring and when necessary 
76. Cf. Laronde (1987: 85-128, 249-56).
77. Paschidis (2008: 97-98) lists IG II2 487 with the honours to Euchares for publishing the laws 
of the nomothetai σκοπεῖν τῶι βουλομένωι καὶ μηδὲ εἷς ἀγνοεῖν τοὺς τῆς πόλεως νόμους as one of 
the measures passed by the Athenians in early 303 in a climate of displeasure with Demetrius. He 
claims that the use of the expression σκοπεῖν τῶι βουλομένωι is a clear democratic gesture which 
implies a polemic against Demetrius’ authoritarian behaviour. Yet Alexis’ fragment is evidence 
that the nomothetai’s action was not viewed in itself as in opposition to Demetrius’ will, but ra-
ther as consistent with it. Moreover Paschidis overplays the reading of σκοπεῖν τῶι βουλομένωι, 
which would be in his interpretation an archaic democratic expression from the fifth century used 
against Demetrius Poliorcetes and his partisans. Its use after 307 can certainly be read as an im-
plicit polemic against Demetrius of Phalerum’s regime (cf. Hedrick 2000a and 2000b: 331-3), yet it 
must be noted that the expression had a particular connection to nomothesia: it was used in the 
fourth-century law on nomothesia (cf. Dem. 24.18) about the advance publicity of new proposals in 
front of the monument of the Eponymous Heroes. If my reconstruction of the role of the nomothetai 
after 307 is correct, the expression is also consistent with the new nomothesia procedure after 307: 
the proposals of the nomothetai had to be ratified by the Assembly, and therefore advance publicity 
was necessary σκοπεῖν τῶι βουλομένωι. It is likely that such a provision was included in the new 
regulations of nomothesia, and therefore the anagrapheus ton nomon was praised for performing his 
role properly, rather than for giving to his action a particularly democratic slant, against Demetri-
us Poliorcetes and his partisans. 
78. This would not be the only case of interference by Demetrius in the selection of Athenian 
magistrates in these years: an unpublished inscription reports that Adeimantus of Lampsakos, a 
philos of king Demetrius, was appointed by the king Athenian στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν two years 
in a row. Petrakos has published this sentence of the inscription and dated the two generalships 
to 306/5 and 305/4 (Petrakos 1999: 32-33 = SEG 49.4; cf. however Habicht 2006: 427 n. 38 who dates 
them instead to 294/3 and 293/2). Cf. Paschidis (2008: 89 n. 2 and 112-13 n. 4), and Wallace (2013 
forthcoming) for a discussion of these generalships and more generally of the career of Adeiman-
tus.
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reform the constitution and the laws of the city, after ten years of often 
undemocratic legislation by Demetrius of Phalerum. Their creation is 
consistent with Athenian tradition, and their role resembles that of the 
nomothetai of the late fifth century, yet it is possible and even likely that 
they were created following an express order by Demetrius Poliorcetes 
after his arrival in Athens, much like the nomographoi were created in Chios 
and in Teos/Lebedos following orders from Alexander and Antigonus.
Conclusions and the third century
It is possible to reconstruct the legislative procedures of early-Hellenistic 
Athens because there is some literary and epigraphical evidence for the 
twenty years following the end of the Lamian war. Regretfully nothing like 
this is possible for the third century: the literary sources do not provide 
evidence about legislative activity detailed enough to follow the evolution 
of the relevant procedures. The inscriptional record can afford us only very 
weak hypotheses based on the argumentum ex silentio that nomothetai are 
never again attested in Athens before the imperial age.79 As I noted above, 
there is to my knowledge no third-century Athenian decree preserved 
on stone that in the fourth century would have been enacted by the 
nomothetai. On the other hand, it is still striking that no nomothetai are ever 
mentioned in any decree, either for the purpose of being honoured, nor of 
ratifying financial arrangements, or for any other reason. They completely 
disappear from the record, with one exception: SEG 37.89 (= Themelis 2002), 
a partially published inscription from the Brauron sanctuary prescribing 
an examination of some structures of the sanctuary to determine which 
ones need repairing. This measure is enacted by the nomothetai, in a fashion 
that resembles fourth-century laws, yet the first scholar to publish a photo 
of the inscription, Papadimitriou, dated the stone to the third century 
and Tracy has dated its writing to 200 BCE or even a bit later.80 In fact, the 
mention of officials such as the Treasurers of the other Gods, absorbed by 
those of Athena in the 340’s,81 and the instructions given to the apodektai 
(never attested after 323/2) and to the poletai (never attested after 307/6),82 
together with ‘connections to the inventories of Artemis Brauronia on 
the Athenian Akropolis and formal epigraphic evidence’ make it virtually 
certain that the contents of this inscription predate the Lamian war.83 If 
the writing on the stone must in fact be dated to the third century, then we 
79. Cf. e.g. IG II² 1010, 1106, 1010, 1122, 1190, 3277, Agora 16.333.
80. Papadimitriou (Ergon 1961: 24-6) and Lambert (2007: 80 n. 38) for Tracy’s opinion.
81. The exact date of the merger of the treasures of Athena and of the Other Gods, with the abo-
lition of the Treasurers of the Other Gods, has been the subject of much debate: Woodward (1940: 
404-6), Linders (1975: 59-61, 101 n. 149) and D. Harris (1991: 213 n. 165) date it to 346/5; Kirchner in 
the commentary to IG II2 1455 and Ferguson (1932: 117 n. 2) date it to 342/1. Papazarkadas (2011: 
30) suggests 344/3 or early 343/2. 
82. The last attestation of the apodektai is IG II² 365; of the poletai IG II² 463. We find both officials in 
a small (and very fragmentary) fragment of an inscription, SEG 25.187, which Meritt (Hesperia 37, 
1968: 286 no. 23) dated to the early second century BCE. Yet the fragment, as P. J. Rhodes confirmed 
to me per litteras, has careless lettering and the dating is very dubious.
83. The case for a fourth-century dating is made extensively in a forthcoming paper by Elizabeth 
Bose. A summary of her arguments can be found as Bose (2009).
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are here, as suggested by Rhodes, before a case of reinscription of a fourth-
century law in the third century.84
Nomothetai never appear in Hellenistic inscriptions from the third 
century, and the argumentum ex silentio, however weak, suggests that no 
officials of this name were in charge of ratifying laws like before 322. My 
reconstruction of the changes in legislation in the last twenty years of the 
fourth century, if reliable, should strengthen this hypothesis: institutional 
change and development in Hellenistic Athens was tightly linked to the 
institutional memory of the Athenians. When they went back to democracy, 
or reformed their constitution in a democratic manner, their model of 
democratic constitution was not necessarily the democracy of the fourth 
century before the Lamian war. They returned, with some changes and 
some reforms, to the institutions of the last time they believed, or had come 
to believe, that they had been democratically governed. Their records of 
constitutional changes were imperfect, rudimentary and debatable; there 
was therefore no ‘proper’ democratic constitution, and often what had 
been considered democratic at a certain point came to be considered later 
as an oligarchic interlude.85 
Accordingly, the Athenians did not in an antiquarian spirit reintroduce 
all the institutions of the classical democracy, and a particular institution 
would cease to be a realistic option as soon as it disappeared from or 
faded in the institutional memory of living and active Athenians. I have 
argued that nomothesia, as a complex procedure of legislation which took 
the responsibility of enacting nomoi from the Assembly and gave it to a 
board of nomothetai, and which involved a special graphe nomon me epitedeion 
theinai for nomoi, was never revived in the twenty (and therefore probably 
thirty) years following the defeat in the Lamian war. If this is the case, 
then it is likely that as a working procedure it had by then disappeared 
from the options open to an Athenian politician or reformer. Statesmen 
as old as Demochares might have remembered from their youth when 
laws were enacted differently from decrees, yet for most of their life and 
political career, spanning through several regimes that defined themselves 
as oligarchic or democratic, laws had been enacted by the Assembly. 
Fourth-century nomothesia was probably still an option in 307/6, and yet 
we have seen that the men who restored democracy chose not to return 
to it. It certainly was not an option in 287, thirty-five years after its last 
appearance. By then, for a separate procedure for enacting nomoi to be 
introduced, the Athenians would have needed reasons and considerations 
leading them almost to invent it anew. The sources provide no conclusive 
evidence indicating that nomothesia as a separate procedure for enacting 
nomoi did not exist in the third century, yet its revival is highly unlikely.
In conclusion given the largely positive account of fourth century 
nomothesia with which I have opened this article, a question remains to be 
answered: whether the twilight of nomothesia should be viewed as a step 
away from democracy and the reflection of a decline in democratic values. 
84. Cf. Lambert (2007: 80 n. 38) for Rhodes’ opinion. He has confirmed this opinion to me per litte-
ras.
85. See e.g. Luraghi (2010) about this phenomenon.
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Nomothesia as it was practised before the Lamian war was a remarkable 
achievement, which aimed to maintain a certain degree of stability in 
the laws by making them difficult to alter and to achieve consistency in 
the ‘code’ of laws. Finally, it provided a process of judicial review for the 
enactments, which strengthened both aspects. In doing this, it fulfilled to 
an impressive extent the requirements for achieving the ‘rule of law’ as the 
term is understood by modern theorists. To give one example, Raz argues 
that ‘rule of law’, when applied to lawgiving, involves 1) proactive rather 
than retroactive legislation, 2) laws that are stable, 3) clear procedures and 
rules for making laws, 4) courts having the power of ‘judicial review’ over 
the way in which the other principles are implemented.86 With the twilight 
of nomothesia the Athenian state certainly went a few steps back in this 
respect, and legislation became more open abuse, the laws less consistent, 
and the constitution less secure. On the other hand, this apparent 
regression should be considered in fact an evolution in tune with the new 
contexts and times. First of all, to conserve a procedure like nomothesia, a 
state needs remarkable stability, which was impossible in the late fourth 
and third century, when the Athenian state was heavily dependent on 
what happened in the international scene. Nomothesia could preserve the 
constitution and the laws from internal disruption, but in 322 proved 
ineffective in preserving it from external shocks. The superior agility of 
the later legislative procedures allowed to the city to adapt more promptly 
to the requests of the new masters, and to revert as promptly to popular 
sovereignty and full suffrage when it was possible. 
Second, there is evidence that despite the lack of a separate procedure 
for passing nomoi, the Athenians still preserved an understanding of the 
differences between the nomoi and psephismata. Honorary decrees for 
magistrates praise them for acting in accordance with the laws and with 
the decrees of the Council and the Assembly (e.g. IG II2 404; 674; 776; 1006; 
1028), politicians are still praised for passing expedient laws (Agora 16.261.1), 
and the distinction between nomoi and psephismata seems to extend to the 
enactments of private associations, as its use in the language of religious 
associations shows.87 The division and hierarchy of laws and decrees must 
have taken roots in the institutional ideology of the Athenians well beyond 
its actual implementation, and although it is hard to tell how this may 
have played out in practice, it is possible that the Athenians preserved an 
understanding of what a law should be about, and how widely it should 
apply, even when they dealt with it in the Assembly as with any decree, and 
acted accordingly. 
Third, and most important, after regimes with limited political 
participation, the solitary legislative action of a man like Demetrius of 
Phalerum who put the Assembly under control of the nomophylakes, possibly 
even the royal imposition by the Polorcetes of nomothetai in charge of 
writing and correcting the laws, allegedly for the very purpose of restoring 
democracy, it is likely that any form of legislation which somehow limited 
the sovereignty of the Assembly would have been felt as intolerable by the 
86. Raz (1977).
87. Arnaoutoglou (2003: 128-9)
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Athenians. The very word nomothetai may have become suspect after its 
instrumental use under Demetrius of Phalerum and the Poliorcetes. In a 
way, the choice in the years 307-301 and in later democratic restorations 
not to recreate a board of nomothetai in charge of ratifying the laws was a 
choice for a more radically democratic constitutional form, against external 
influence and the previous limitation to the sovereignty of the demos. 
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